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In currency exchange markets, there is a conflict between individual decisions and the 
socially optimal solution. Whereas agents have a coordination motive to take the same 
position, at the social level effective market coordination per se is not socially valuable, and 
the central bank aims at driving agents’ actions as close as possible to the economic 
fundamental state. Some studies argue that it might be better to withhold public information 
because its potential to serve as a focal point induces agents to exaggerate the importance of 
public announcements. This paper shows that public information should always be provided 
with maximum precision, but under certain condition not to all agents. Restrictions on the 
degree of publicity are a better instrument with which to prevent the negative welfare effects 
of public announcements than restrictions on their precision are. The optimal degree of 
publicity is always positive. 
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1 – Introduction 
There is an ongoing debate about the relative merits of public information in financial markets 
and in macroeconomic environments that are characterized by positive externalities. During 
speculative episodes on the currency exchange market, agents not only have an interest in 
responding to the underlying fundamental but also have a coordination motive to take the 
same action, because their actions represent strategic complements. Nevertheless, at the social 
level, effective market coordination per se is not socially valuable, and the central bank aims 
at driving agents’ actions as close as possible to the economic fundamental situation. 
Macroeconomic stabilisation tries to avoid any form of overreaction, and crashes in particular. 
In situations of financial distress, the strong focal potential exerted by public information can 
be welfare damaging because it induces overreactions. 
Previous literature has concentrated on analyzing the optimal precision of public 
information. They generally yield “bang-bang solutions”, where public information should 
either be as precise as possible or be avoided entirely. In this paper, we explore another 
dimension of public information: the degree of publicity, by which we mean the proportion of 
economic agents amongst whom a message is common knowledge. We show that it may be 
optimal to provide information with an interior degree of publicity either by informing only 
predetermined agents or by informing agents at random with a probability below one.  
The discussion about the distinct effects of public and private information started with the 
application of the theory of global games to speculative-attack games by Morris and Shin 
(1998, 1999). They show that speculative-attack games have unique equilibria if private 
information is sufficiently precise in relation to public information. Heinemann and Illing 
(2002), Metz (2002) and Bannier and Heinemann (2004) analyze how the ex-ante probability 
of currency crises is affected by the relative precision of public and private information.  
Morris and Shin (2002) present a stylized coordination game with a unique equilibrium in 
which public information may be detrimental to welfare if its precision is limited by 
inevitable forecast errors. Their model emphasizes the role of public information as a focal 
point for private actions. Strategic complementarities provide incentives to coordinate on the 
publicly announced state of the world and neglect private information. If public 
announcements are inaccurate, private actions are drawn away from the fundamental value. 
Public information is a double-edged instrument: it conveys valuable information, but the 
desire to coordinate leads agents to condition their actions stronger on public announcements   3
than is optimal. Both effects get stronger if the precision of public information rises. An 
infinite precision of public information maximizes welfare. However, if its precision has an 
upper limit, it may be better not to provide any public information at all than disseminating 
information with maximum precision. Morris and Shin (2002) conclude that a welfare 
maximizing information provider might want to reduce the precision of public signals or 
avoid them entirely.  
All of these papers distinguish two extreme kinds of signals: messages that are received by 
single agents only (private information) and messages that are common knowledge to all 
agents (public information). In the present paper, we allow for intermediate degrees of 
publicity, i.e. messages that are common knowledge to only a fraction of agents. It turns out 
that the degree of publicity is a powerful instrument of information policy. Especially in 
situations where public information may be detrimental by coordinating agents’ activities 
away from social optimum, messages of high precision but limited publicity are superior to 
pure public information with low precision: for those who receive the signals, a high precision 
of information about underlying fundamentals enhances efficiency of private decisions. The 
limited degree of publicity, however, reduces incentives to overreact to public signals and 
prevents them from reducing welfare by pulling actions away from social optimum. 
Revisiting the beauty contest framework of Morris and Shin (2002), we show that public 
information should always be provided with maximum precision, but under circumstances not 
be disclosed to all agents. The optimal degree of publicity is always positive.  
Our framework enables us to find some original economic policy results. We show that 
restrictions to the number of people receiving public signals are a more efficient tool for 
avoiding precarious coordination effects than the ambiguity of signals is. The rationale behind 
this result is linked with the reduction in agents’ overreaction to sometimes imprecise 
(mistaken) public announcements. The central bank disposes of two different tools to conduct 
economic policy: the precision of information and the level of information disclosure. Both 
instruments are double-edged: higher precision improves the quality of private decisions by 
those who receive information and higher publicity enlarges the number of those who benefit 
from information. At the same time, both instruments raise incentives to overweigh public 
signals. To understand the advantage of limited publicity, consider an extreme case: suppose 
that in (certain) appropriate situations the central bank does not release any public 
information, as recommended by Morris and Shin (2002). How does social welfare change if 
the central bank releases information with the highest possible precision to a very small   4
proportion of agents? Those who receive the information benefit from its precision. The small 
degree of publicity, however, prevents its role as coordination device. Thereby, agents who 
receive this public signal attribute the optimal weight to it when maximizing expected utility. 
It is always valuable to have better information as long as agents do not overreact to it, which 
can be prevented by a limited degree of publicity. Therefore, it can never be optimal to 
withhold information entirely. 
Angeletos and Pavan (2004) and Hellwig (2004) also challenge the conclusions of Morris 
and Shin (2002). Considering economies with increasing returns to scale (Angeletos and 
Pavan) or monopolistic competition (Hellwig), they find that the precision of public 
information is always welfare increasing. The reason for this is the different notion of 
individual utility. In Morris and Shin (2002), the payoff of a player decreases with the 
distance between his own action and the action of others, but this distance is irrelevant from a 
social perspective. As Angeletos and Pavan (2004, p.3) put it: “[…] more transparent public 
information facilitates more effective coordination, which is valued by the market but not by 
the society”. Instead, they consider environments in which there is complementarity at the 
social level so that coordination is socially valuable
1. However, financial markets are better 
characterized by coordination games, in which it is socially desirable to avoid any form of 
overreaction, so that it is always better to evaluate a currency or a firm in terms of the 
fundamental state of the economy rather than the beliefs of market participants.  
We define the degree of publicity of a message as the largest fraction of agents amongst 
whom the message is common knowledge. A message is common knowledge among some 
groups of agents if each agent in this group knows that every other agent in the group knows 
that each member of the group received the message and so on. The degree of publicity is 
closely related to common p-beliefs that have been introduced by Monderer and Samet 
(1989). An event is common p-belief among agents if all of them believe with at least 
probability p that this event has occurred, all agents believe with at least probability p that all 
others believe with at least probability p that this event has occurred, and so on. A message 
that is released to some fraction p of the total population is common knowledge among this 
group of agents and common p-belief among the total population. Thereby, we suggest a 
practicable mechanism to induce common p-beliefs and overcome the traditional dichotomy 
between strictly public information on the one hand and strictly private information on the 
                                                 
1 Angeletos and Pavan (2004, p.3) argue that this “is likely to be the case in economies with production and 
demand spillovers, network externalities, or incomplete financial markets”. 
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other. Hellwig (2002) shows that common p-beliefs solve a puzzle arising from the distinct 
features of speculative-attack games with public and private information. The more precise 
private information is in relation to public information, the lower is the degree of common p-
beliefs. If p is sufficiently low, the speculative-attack game has a unique equilibrium. 
Common  p-beliefs and our degree of publicity are both intermediate concepts to fill the 
dimension between pure private and pure public information continuously.  
Recent laboratory experiments on coordination games with private and public information 
(Cabrales, Nagel and Armenter (2003), Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2004) and Cornand 
(2004)) indicate that there are only small differences in the perception of public and private 
signals. Their data reject the hypothesis that predictability is reduced with public information. 
On the contrary, they show that agents’ behaviour is very similar in both informational 
contexts. This result suggests that public information does not necessarily lead to common 
knowledge: differences in the treatment of public information seem to prevent common 
knowledge and create lower levels of higher order beliefs. A possible explanation is provided 
by Nagel (1995) and Kübler and Weizsäcker (2003), who show that subjects in laboratory 
experiments behave in accordance with a limited number of levels of reasoning about others. 
On the other hand, Cornand (2004) shows that subjects overweigh the public signal if they 
receive a private and a public signal about the payoff of a coordination game. Thereby, the 
focal potential of public information cannot be neglected. We conjecture that intermediate 
concepts like common p-beliefs are better qualified to describe the state of minds after public 
announcements. A possible interpretation for a real economy is that there is always some 
probability that an agent misses an announcement or misunderstands it.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 
solves for the unique equilibrium and establishes the position of the model by Morris and 
Shin (2002) as a particular case of our framework. Section 4 gives our policy prescription 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 – The Model  
Our framework is based on Morris and Shin (2002) who describe a reminiscence of Keynes’ 
“beauty contest” example. Whereas they assume that public announcements are received by 
all agents and the information provider can choose the precision of public signals, we enlarge 
the choice set of the information provider by adding a second dimension: the degree of   6
publicity that we model by the fraction of agents who receive a signal. We consider two 
schemes of providing information: public signals may be disseminated to a predetermined 
group of agents or to each agent with some probability. The first interpretation accounts for 
the possibility of central banks to spread news in certain communities or in a language that is 
understood only by some agents. The second interpretation is more related to the practical 
difficulties in achieving common knowledge. Public announcement may be spread though 
media, but each market participant acknowledges a certain medium only with some 
probability. These probabilities may differ for different media, so that a central bank can 
choose the degree of publicity by selecting media for publication.  
 
2.1. A beauty contest framework 
Our model is a principal-agent two-stage game in which the central bank (principal) 
determines the optimal precision and the degree of publicity that maximise welfare before the 
speculators (agents) take their decision. There is a continuum of agents, indexed by the unit 
interval [0,1]. Agent i chooses an action  ℜ ∈ i a , and we write a for the action profile over all 
agents. The payoff function for agent i is given by 
()( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 1 , L L r a r a u i i i − − − − − ≡ θ θ , 
where θ  is the fundamental state of the economy and r is a constant, such that 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 and 
() ∫ − ≡
1
0
2dj a a L i j i ,   ∫ ≡
1
0
dj L L j . 
The utility function for individual i has two components. The first component is a standard 
quadratic loss in the distance between the underlying state θ and his action ai. The second 
component is the “beauty contest” term. The loss is increasing in the distance between i’s 
action and the average action of the whole population. The parameter r is the weight 
attributed to this strategic uncertainty: the higher r is, the higher is the external effect arising 
from the coordination motive of decision makers.  
However, this spillover effect is socially inefficient and disappears at the social level. 
Therefore there may be a conflict between individual decisions and the socially optimal 
solution. Social welfare is defined as the (normalized) average of individual utilities, given by   7
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As a consequence, the social planner, who cares only about social welfare, seeks to keep all 
agents’ actions close to the state θ .  
 
2.2. Structure of uncertainty and timing of the game 
Agents face uncertainty concerning θ. However, to decide on an action, they potentially 
receive two kinds of signals that deviate from θ by some error terms with normal 
distributions. Each agent receives a private signal  
xi = θ + εi   with   εi ~N(0,1/β). 
Signals of distinct individuals are independent and the distribution of private signals is treated 
as exogenously given. Eventually, agents have access to a public signal  
y θ η =+   with   η ~ N(0,1/α). 
The public signal is given to each agent with some probability P. Since we have a 
continuum of identical agents, the fraction of agents who receive public information equals P 
almost certainly. Without loss of generality, we may assume that agents  ] , 0 [ P i∈  receive the 
public signal and agents  ] 1 , (P i∈  must rely on their private signals only. The signal y is 
“public” in the sense that the actual realization of y is common knowledge among agents 
] , 0 [ P i∈ . Parameters α and β are the precisions of public and private signals.  
The optimal action of agent i is given by the first order condition: 
( ) ( ) ( ) a rE E r a i i i + − = θ 1  
where Ei ( . ) is the expectation operator of player i and  ∫ =
1
0
dj a a j  is the average action in the 
population. The following expressions come straightforwardly: 
-  The expected state for an agent who does not receive y but possesses his own private 
information is given by E(θ | xi) = xi and his expected average action is given by 
( ) i i x x a E = .    8
-  The expected state for an agent who receives y on top of his own private signal is 
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The game consists of two stages. First, the principal (central bank) chooses the level of 
public information disclosure P and its precision α in order to maximize expected welfare. 
Then, in the second stage, agents choose their actions ai maximizing expected utility. An 
equilibrium of the game consists of strategies for the central bank and for the continuum of 
speculators such that no player has an incentive to deviate. First, we solve the subgame of the 
second stage for a given combination of P and α.  
 
3 – Equilibrium  
Agents who do not receive the public signal choose ai = xi. For the normal distribution all 
conditional expectations are linear combinations of available information. The first order 
condition shows that the optimal action is a linear function of conditional expectations. 
Thereby, the optimal strategy of any agent who receives the public signal y is a linear strategy 
of the form 
( )y x a j j γ γ − + = 1.  
The optimal weight γ  depends on an agent’s expectations about the behaviour of other 
players. Because the best response of any agent is unique, in equilibrium, all players choose 
the same γ . The conditional estimate of the average action across all agents is then given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [] ( ) ( ) j j x E P y E x E P a E − + − + = 1 1 γ γ . 
For any agent i who receives both signals: 
( ) () ( ) [] ( ) ( )
() ( ) ()
() ( ) . 1 1
, 1 1
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Thus, agent i’s optimal action, for  ] , 0 [ P i∈ , is given by   9
( ) ( ) ( )
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This equation shows that, in equilibrium, actions are distorted away from θ towards y. The 
distortion increases in the precision of public information, α , and in the proportion of agents 
receiving it, P. 
-  when α→0,  0 → P  or  ∞ → β , then  θ = a : when public information is extremely 
imprecise or given to almost nobody, or when private information is extremely 
precise, then public information loses its coordination role and is ignored. 
-  when  ∞ → α  or  0 → β , then  ( ) yP P a + − = 1 θ : when public information is 
extremely precise or private information extremely imprecise, those who receive 
public information will disregard private information and choose  y ai = . The others 
can only use private signals, which are distributed around θ . Hence, those without 
public information will choose an average action of θ . 
The model of Morris and Shin (2002) represents a special case of our framework in which 
P = 1 is exogenously fixed. Under such circumstances, it is certain that all agents receive a 
private and a public signal (y is thus common knowledge among the agents). Here, the unique 














The weight on public information clearly exceeds its weight in  ( ) y x E i, | θ , which is only 
) /( β α α + . This mirrors the disproportionate impact of the public signal in coordinating 
agents’ actions. Since there is no other instrument, the only way to restrict the potential 
damaging effects of public information is a limitation of their precision. Our more general 
framework provides the central bank with a second instrument that may be superior in 
reducing the damages of public information. 
 
4 – Welfare implications and policy prescriptions 
Let us now turn to the first stage of the game and derive the optimal degree of publicity. Since 
this is our main innovation, we will first calculate the optimal degree of publicity P for 
precision α  being given exogenously, before we turn to the more general solution, in which 
we solve for the optimal combination of both variables. 
 
4.1. Optimal degree of information disclosure 
How is welfare affected by the degree of public information disclosure? And what is the 
interplay between the precision of information and the level of disclosure in terms of welfare 
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* . The optimal 
degree of publicity 
* P  is smaller than one if, and only if  1 3 − < r
β
α
. This shows that it is   11
better to disclose public information with a low precision only to a limited audience if 
coordination is a sufficiently strong motive. For r < 1/3, we always get the corner solution P
* 
= 1. 
Conclusion 1: For all r ≥ 1/3 (sufficiently strong strategic complementarity), the optimal 
degree of publicity P
* (α,β) is smaller than 1, if the private signal is sufficiently precise 
compared to the public signal. 
The intuition for such a result is that a partial disclosure of information can avoid 
overreaction to a signal which is potentially far from the true state (when the public signal is 
imprecise). An imperfect degree of common information disclosure generates a mechanism in 
which the negative influence of agents’ overreaction is outweighed by the positive impact of 
coordination (on θ).  
In terms of economic policy, the central bank (in order to maximize social welfare) can 
have an interest in not perfectly disclosing public information (i.e. not giving public signals 
with probability 1) because of agents’ overreaction to public announcements. The existence of 
a public signal received with a certain probability smaller than one will mitigate the 
potentially “bad effect” of overreaction while keeping the “good effect” of coordination on θ. 
Hence, the central bank is provided with an open door for “constructive ambiguity”, which 
means that it can intentionally create ambiguity by disclosing information to a certain level 
(that is with some probability) implying relatively poor visibility, so as to avoid potentially 
damaging self-fulfilling beliefs and limit overreaction to its timely but not necessarily 
accurate public announcements. 
For a better interpretation, we calculate the relative precision between the two types of 











. So  2
α
β
≥  implies P
* = 1. When the public signal is at least twice as 
precise as the private signal, public information should be disclosed to all agents with 
probability 1. 
On the other hand, if the private signal xi is extremely precise (so that β  ∞ → ), or when 
the public signal y is extremely imprecise (so that α  →0), then it is optimal to disclose the 
public signal with a probability of  ) 3 /( 1
* r P → . 
In the limit, when α approaches zero, public information becomes worthless and will be 
disregarded even by those who receive it. Thus, for α =0, the degree of publicity is irrelevant.   12




 and increases with rising precision α.  
 
4.2. Optimal precision of information 
The determination of a unique equilibrium also enables us to address the question of the 
impact of signals’ precision in terms of welfare effects. The impact of the precision of public 
information on expected welfare is 




























The sign of 
α ∂
∂E
 is ambiguous. If 2rP > 1 and private information is sufficiently precise, an 
increase in the precision of public information is detrimental to welfare. The case P = 1 
resembles Morris and Shin’s (2002) result according to which the precision of public 
information increases welfare if, and only if  ( )( ) 1 2 1 − − ≥ r r β α .  
If 1 2 < rP  or if private information is imprecise (small β ), then the precision of public 
information increases welfare. 
Conclusion 2: Increasing the precision of the public signal has positive welfare effects if 
the degree of publicity is sufficiently small. 
 
We also have: 
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. 
This means that increasing the precision of private information is always a better policy.  
Conclusion 3: Increasing the precision of the private signal is always welfare increasing. 
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If public information can be provided with infinite precision ( ∞ → α ), then  θ = y  almost 
certainly and full publication (P = 1) leads agents to choose  y ai = . Thereby, the expected 
welfare loss is zero, which is the first best solution.  
 
4.3. Second best optimum for a limited precision of public information 
Inevitable forecast errors limit the precision of public information, which is, after all, just the 
inverse variance between the public announcement and the ex-post realization of the 
fundamental state. Morris and Shin (2002) show that for P  = 1, public information with 
limited precision can lead to a higher welfare loss than no public information at all: agents 
may prefer following a public signal, even of poor quality, because this enhances 
coordination. However due to the poor quality of y, the coordination point is likely to be 
distorted away from the efficient level θ. Therefore, the public signal imposes an external 
effect: it induces all individuals who receive it towards the same action and, thereby, leads to 
a likely derivation of activities from θ. Such amplification in the initial noise is painful for all 
agents and damaging for welfare of the society as a whole. 
If the principal has the option to choose the optimal degree of publicity P
*, then the 
optimal precision is always maximal. To see this, compare P
* with the condition for welfare 
increasing effects of public information precision. An increase in α  raises expected welfare if 
() ( ) 1 2 1 − − ≥ rP rP β α . The optimal degree of publicity 






which is equivalent to  ( ) 1 3
* − ≥ rP β α . Since ( ) ( )( ) 1 2 1 1 3
* * * − − > − rP rP rP , we conclude 
that an increase in α  always raises expected welfare if the degree of public information is 
chosen optimally.  
Whenever the principal faces upper limits to the possible precision of public information, 
such that  [] α α , 0 ∈ , then the second best solution is to provide public information with the 
highest possible precision α  and release it to a proportion  ) (
* α P  of all agents. The optimal 
degree of publicity is smaller than 1 if α  is sufficiently small. Whenever α  is so small that 
Morris and Shin’s (2002) conclusion applies for P = 1, then  ) (
* α P  < 1. But, even if α  is 
larger, so that Morris and Shin would prefer maximum precision over none, the optimal 
degree of publicity may be less than one.   14
As a consequence, we can state the main result of the paper: even if the precision of public 
information is restricted by someα , the central bank should provide public information with 
maximal (possible) precision, but with some probability P that is below 1 if α  is sufficiently 
small.  
Main theorem: The second best optimal policy for  [ ] α α , 0 ∈  is given by  α α =
















We summarize these findings in Figure 1. Solid curves represent social welfare contours in 
the (α,P)-space. Arrows indicate the direction of increasing welfare. The lower broken line is 
) (
* α P . The upper broken curve indicates the points above which an increase in α  reduces 
welfare. Whenever  ) 1 3 ( − < r β α , the optimal degree of publicity is smaller than one.  
 















) 1 3 ( − r β    15
When the central bank discloses public information with certainty (P = 1), and it cannot 
achieve public signal’s precision beyond some upper boundary, no information ( 0 = α ) may 
be better than maximum precision (α ). Morris and Shin (2002, p. 1529) conclude that: "[…] 
even if the choice of α entails no cost, we will see a “bang-bang” solution to the choice of 
optimal α in which the social optimum entails either providing no public information at all 
[…] or providing the maximum feasible amount of public information". 
Such a (“bang-bang”) result does not hold anymore, once we relax the assumption that 
public signals are received by all agents with certainty. The tool of limiting the degree of 
publication allows for the exploitation of the positive feature of precise as possible public 
information: those who receive the public signal can improve their decisions, while 
withholding information entirely waives these profits for all agents.  
 
5 - Conclusion 
A lack of transparency has often been blamed for the turbulences that have swept through 
financial markets in recent years. Consequently, the international financial institutions have 
actively promoted more transparency among their member countries. Any information is 
valuable to the receiver and it is natural to conjecture that transparency increases welfare.  
Recently, a number of papers have argued that transparency may actually reduce expected 
welfare from an ex-ante point of view. Geraats (2002) gives an overview with several 
examples of welfare reducing information in a Barro-Gordon framework. The theory of global 
games shows that public information may induce self-fulfilling beliefs and has the potential to 
destabilize an economy. To the extent that financial markets exhibit strategic 
complementarities, common knowledge amplifies the impact of new information and 
provokes runs into or out of a market, because of higher order beliefs.  
If public information may be detrimental to welfare, the question arises of how to respond 
to this threat. So far, most authors argue that information should be withheld or the precision 
of public information should be reduced. This paper shows that it may be more efficient to 
reduce the degree of publicity and disseminate information in communities or through media 
that reach only a part of all traders. A limited degree of publicity leads to common knowledge 
among receivers and to common p-beliefs among the whole population. It combines the 
positive effects of valuable information for those who get it with a confinement of its threats   16
by limiting the number of receivers. This is a second-best solution for the case that the 
precision of public announcements is bounded by exogenous restrictions.  
Heinemann and Illing (2002) suggest yet another solution: the central bank should release 
information to each agent privately with some idiosyncratic noise, thereby avoiding common 
knowledge. As we have seen, an increasing precision of private information is always 
beneficial. However, our results indicate that even when the central bank provides private 
information to agents it should, in addition, publish information as precisely as possible to 
some group of agents. The higher the precision of private information is, the lower is the 
optimal degree of publicity. But, in our model it never falls below 1/(3r). The provision of 
private information should always be accompanied by some publication.  
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